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Abstract. In this paper we analyze the time series of daily average prices
generated in the Italian electricity market, which started to operate as a Pool in
April 2004. The objective is to characterize the high degree of autocorrelation
and multiple seasonalities in the electricity prices. We use periodic time series
models with GARCH disturbances and leptokurtic distributions and compare
their performance with more classical ARMA-GARCH processes. The within-year
seasonal variation is modelled using the low frequencies components of physical
quantities, which are very regular throughout the sample. Results reveal that
much of the variability of the price series is explained by deterministic multiple
seasonalities which interact with each other. Periodic AR-GARCH models seem
to perform quite well in mimicking the features of the stochastic part of the price
process.
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1. Introduction
Electricity prices as they are now determined in regulated (generally,
Pool) markets, where private operators have replaced previously well
established public enterprises, present everywhere speciﬁc behavioral
characteristics. On the one hand, these market-determined prices diﬀer
from the prices ﬁxed by governments or public agencies until the end
of the last century. In fact, in spite of the very limited storability
and transportability of electricity, government-determined prices in-
corporated little uncertainty in their dynamics as they were generally
capped by the imposition of some price ceilings resulting from the
implementation of welfare-improving tariﬀ policies. On the contrary,
market determined electricity prices are strongly aﬀected by the impos-
sibility of arbitrage between time and space and so they have become
very volatile. Yet, time series of current electricity prices diﬀer quite
substantially from prices determined in markets for ﬁnancial assets and
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other type of commodities since electricity (as well as many physical
commodities) cannot be treated like a stock. Electricity prices have spe-
ciﬁc and somehow unique characteristics (e.g. strong seasonalities and
mean reversion) that has motivated in the recent past the use of appro-
priate time series modelling to study the speciﬁc features of their time
pattern and to evaluate how prices are aﬀected by temporal demand-
supply imbalances, seasonality, transmission congestion and, to a lesser
extent, by the features of the mechanism that generates the data (type
of auction employed, price rule, degree of market concentration, etc.).
In Italy the privatization of the former public (quasi)monopolist
eventually lead to the creation of an electricity Pool which started to
operate in April 2004 with some speciﬁc legal characteristics such as
the presence of Single Buyer on the demand side. In this paper we try
and describe the price dynamics of the Italian Pool and compare our
ﬁndings with those obtained by authors who analyzed other European
markets. We also suggest some methodological estimation procedures
that may prove useful for further research in the econometric analysis
of electricity prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main
characteristics of some European electricity markets for which data
availability permits time series analyses. We emphasize the diﬀerences
in the organization and regulation of the markets as well as in the
production structure (speciﬁcally, electricity generation) that might
become important in explaining diﬀerences in the econometric results.
In Section 3 we describe the main characteristics of the Italian Pool.
Section 4 contains a selected review of the existing literature. In Section
5 we introduce and illustrate some general characteristics of the Italian
data and take care of the deterministic part of the models. Section 6
describes and motivates the choice of the stochastic models and meth-
ods employed to estimate the dynamics of the Italian prices. Results
are shown in Section 7 and section 8 concludes.
2. The electricity markets in the European Countries
In this section we describe some general characteristics of the main
European electricity exchanges alongside with the main features of each
national electricity industry.
The England and Wales (E&W) Electricity Pool started in 1991
after the liberalization of the British electricity market. Since then,
competitive electricity markets have been organized in many other
countries. Here we consider the Nord Pool, Austria, France, Germany,
Netherlands, Spain, and particularly Italy. The key features of most
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of these experiences have been, in the ﬁrst place, the privatization
and restructuring of the vertically integrated monopolistic suppliers
previously existing. The second step was the organization of the ex-
change of physical electricity as competitive wholesale spot markets in
the form of wholesale auctions. Competition has been introduced also
at the retail level whereas transmission/distribution, which are still
considered natural monopolies, remains under government regulation.
All the industry reorganization activity has lead to a separation of
potentially competitive elements from natural monopolies.
The wholesale exchange of electricity poses some problems of market
architecture and design to regulators. In the ﬁrst place, it must be
decided whether to opt for a centralized Pool or for a decentralized mar-
ket. In the ﬁrst case, all the electricity must be allocated through the
Pool which is then mandatory; this implies that bilateral contracts are
not allowed. All operators, both on the demand and on the supply side,
submit hourly or half-hourly bids which are matched by a procedure
that minimizes the cost of despatch. A decentralized electricity market
like NETA (England) and California, on the contrary, is organized as a
series of voluntary forward and spot markets and bilateral contracting
is allowed. The advantages of a Pool market over a decentralized one
is that demand and supply are continuously matched so that all co-
ordination problems disappear. Advocates of the decentralized market
structure emphasize, however, that the Pool may be aﬀected by strate-
gic bidding on the part of those operators having some market power
and, as a consequence, the Pool prices do not generally reveal costs.
Whilst the issue is still open at the theoretical level, on the empirical
side we ﬁnd many examples, especially in Europe, of non-mandatory
electricity Pools, where bilateral contracts are allowed. This choice is
probably motivated by the desire to capture the main advantages of
the two alternative organization schemes.
Electricity Pools work as multi-unit uniform price auctions: opera-
tors submit price/quantity oﬀers which are aggregated by the market
operator in order to form a demand (where demand side bidding is
allowed) and a supply curve. The equilibrium price and quantity are
then determined by the usual crossing condition and all the producers
despatched receive the same System Marginal Price (SMP) equal to
the bid made by the marginal unit called into operation.
As mentioned above, the ﬁrst European experience of a central-
ized market for the exchange of physical electricity among producers,
distributors and eligible ﬁnal consumers was the British Pool market
which started in 1991 and more recently evolved to a decentralized
market (NETA).
ElectricityIAER01.tex; 17/05/2006; 10:35; p.34
The North Pool, who started in 1993, is the oldest electricity market
established in continental Europe. It was the unique example of cross-
country exchange area and for this reason it might represent a ﬁrst step
towards the integration of the European electricity industry. It links
together Norway, which is the founding country, Sweden, who joined
in 1996, Finland (1998) and the western part of Denmark (1999). The
participation to the North Pool is voluntary.
Omel operated since 1998 as the Spanish market, but it recently
became the Iberian Market after the integration of the Portuguese area
(2005).
In a similar way, the German EEX (European Electricity Exchange)
uniﬁes since 2002 two exchanges previously operating in Leipzig (LPX)
and in Frankfurt (EEX).
In the north area of Europe the APX (Amsterdam Power Exchange)
operates since 1999; the APX Group is also in charge of the British
UKPX since 2003.
Power Next operates since 2001 as the French electricity market.
Finally, the Austrian market EXAA is active since 2002.
All the above mentioned electricity markets share some common
characteristics. All the systems are non mandatory markets. Producers
and consumers/distributors are allowed to engage in bilateral con-
tracts for the short or long term exchange of electricity. The quantity
traded bilaterally is usually included in the total supply recorded in
the exchange as zero price oﬀers. A second common characteristic is
the existence of demand side bidding. However, the opening of the
bidding process to demand has not proceeded at a common pace in
all countries. Indeed, following the European Directive 2003/54/EC,
all customers have to be considered as eligible by the 1st July 2007.
This means that at that date all consumers ought to be in a condition
to buy electricity directly in the day-ahead market. At present, how-
ever, in almost all markets considered, only large (mainly industrial)
consumers and distributors are allowed to present the demand bids.
Another important common characteristic of the European electricity
exchanges is the pricing rule. All day-ahead markets have chosen the
SMP rule on a hourly basis. This means that 24 auctions are held the
day before the delivery, one for each hour of the next day; the last unit
despatched, namely the production unit that is necessary to match
the last MWh demanded, ﬁxes the closing hourly price for the entire
market. Therefore, all units which have been selected by the auction
receive the SMP, for the whole quantity they sell.
The EU Electricity Directive 2003/54 requires each country to im-
plement both legal and functional unbundling for transmission and
distribution system operators. This rule is expected to lead to non-
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discriminatory network access with tariﬀs which broadly reﬂect costs.
Although the provisions of the Directive have usually been transposed
into national laws, it is not clear whether network companies have yet
modiﬁed all aspects of their organization to comply with the new law.
The requirement to have legally unbundled and independently managed
transmission system operators (TSO) should have been implemented by
1 July 2004. All the countries considered have accomplished to the legal
unbundling of network operators, but in some cases there is still overlap
between ownership of the TSO and ownership of one (usually the former
monopolist) electricity supplier. This is the case, for example, of the
French market where RTE is a limited company held by EDF and by
the State. In the Nord Pool the State owns both the TSO and some
shares in a generating company.
In all the countries considered the electricity Pool market is orga-
nized by a market operator (MO, auctioneer). In the former vertically
integrated electricity industry, the central operators had full knowledge
of operation and fuel cost curves of each unit. They despatched and re-
dispatched the system by using security constrained optimal power ﬂow
(OPF), which was based on the generation fuel cost optimization. In the
deregulated electricity markets the (unconstrained) market dispatch
process is similar in the sense that MO collects bids and organizes
the despatching of units in a cost minimizing way. This auction-based
dispatching does not take transmission conditions into account and
so congestions may occur. The main features of the mechanisms im-
plemented to manage congestions has changed in favour of a system
compatible with the bid-price-based optimization. When congestion
occurs on the transmission line the market operator together with the
TSO try and relieve it at the minimum possible cost in a market based
way. Either voluntary adjustment bids from generators and loads are
used in the optimization procedure to minimize the cost of adjustments,
or bids submitted in the day-ahead market are used to change the
provisional despatch program when it is unfeasible given the transmis-
sion constraints. Market based procedures are totally diﬀerent from the
traditional regulated congestion procedures with centralized mandatory
least-cost dispatch. However, the allocation of the congestion costs may
be performed in more than one method. One substantial diﬀerence
depends upon whether or not locational prices are calculated directly
in the electricity day-ahead market. Alternatively, separate markets
for the congestion management may be implemented when the day-
ahead market allocations result unfeasible. In both cases the electricity
price results to be diﬀerent across areas, namely higher in the congested
areas and lower in the “exporting” areas, and so prices send the correct
signals to operators.
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In the old UK Pool, on the contrary, the cost of congestion man-
agement was allocated uniformly to all market participants based on
system uplifts. However, a uniform price over the network can give
incorrect signals for the location of new power plants. Nodal prices are
applied in PJM, ISO-NE, ISO-NY whereas zonal prices prevailed in
the Nordic Pool and in Italy. Nodal prices would provide the correct
location price signals, but they could be very sensitive to operating con-
ditions and network characteristics. Zonal pricing is thought to combine
a good performance in sending signals to the market together with a
fairly simple implementation. The resolution of bottlenecks is managed
by the splitting of markets into zones characterized by diﬀerent equi-
librium prices. In the congested area the price is higher than the one
prevailing in the non-congested area. The determination of the diﬀerent
zones is managed diﬀerently across markets. In Italy, for example, zones
are predetermined on the basis of historical observation and knowledge
of the grid line. The day-ahead market IPEX therefore closes with
diﬀerent zonal prices and so it solves the congestion without the need
of resorting to a speciﬁc congestion market. In the same manner, within
Norway - and at the interconnections between the Nordic countries -
price mechanisms are used to relieve grid congestion (bottlenecks), by
introducing diﬀerent Elspot area prices1. The total geographic market
is divided into bidding areas; these may become separate price areas if
the contractual ﬂow of power between bid areas exceeds the capacity
allocated for Elspot contracts by transmission system operators. When
such grid congestion develops, two or more area prices are created.
In Norway, because of the topology of its transmission system, most
congestion will appear as overloads in certain transmission corridors.
In the Nordic Pool, congestion would mostly exist at the same trans-
mission elements since its geographical characteristic leads to power
ﬂows in the north-south direction because the large part of hydro plant
production is placed in the north while consumption is more spread out
in the south. Therefore, the zone deﬁnition is easy to implement and
the market splitting method is feasible for its congestion management.
In Austria, which is an important transit country, congestion on the
network occurs because of a high quota of energy that goes through to
the lines in order to be delivered abroad. Therefore, the network capac-
ity in this country is extremely valuable and as a result network access
tariﬀs are settled at the highest level with respect to other countries.
The electricity markets considered diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their under-
lying production structure. This is a very important point since all the
issues related to the market design become less severe when the industry
is per se more competitive. It is well known that electricity can be
generated in a variety of ways and using diﬀerent types of input, which
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can be either renewable or not-renewable. The cost of the unit of energy
supplied depends upon the technology and this inﬂuences the shape of
the system marginal cost function and hence of the system marginal
price. The productive mix of the generating industry is thought to
inﬂuence the market power of ﬁrms, their strategic behavior and ﬁnally
the prices for energy. The Nord Pool comprises countries where an high
percentage of production comes from hydro resources (56.7%) and still
better does Austria where the hydro covers the 69% of total production.
Spain and France present similar ﬁgures (11.8% and 11% respectively)
on hydroelectric production but France has a very high percentage
of nuclear production (78%). Netherlands and Germany have a small
quota of hydroelectric production (0.1 and 4.2 respectively).
The Nordic area appears to have the more competitive power mar-
ket. This must be considered together with the high percentage of hydro
plants. It is not surprising, then, that Finland, Sweden and Norway
prices are well below the EU average, even if they rose slightly due to
fuel price increase. The French market is characterized by a high level
of concentration (EDF has 90% share of the market) and by a high
consumers’ protection, which results in low regulated tariﬀs. Power
Next account for a small quota of total energy consumed (low level of
liquidity, about 3%). This is also the case of Germany where only the
11% of energy is traded on EEX. France and Germany have recently
installed new wind plants. All the other markets appear to be fairly
concentrated and have a low liquidity share (see Table I).
Table I. Wholesale Market Positions – end 2004
Country
Number of companies
with at least 5% share
of production capacity
Total share of the 3
largest producers
Liquidity
Austria 5 54% 3%
Finland 10 40% 42%
Sweden 10 40% 42%
Norway 10 40% 42%
France 1 96% 3%
Germany 5 72% 11%
Italy 5 65% 21%
Netherland 4 69% 12%
Portugal 3 76% -
Spain 3 69% 92%
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We therefore conclude that across European countries the level of
concentration in generation is still high and this creates the scope for
market power and the ability to inﬂuence prices. The strong position of
incumbent operators has not been eroded in a signiﬁcant way by invest-
ments in generation by new entrants. New generation assets normally
entail signiﬁcant investment costs which are seen as a major barrier to
entry. Complex planning procedures and the scarcity of suitable sites
have also been named as reasons why the building of new power plants
does not take place. Uncertainties associated with the power exchanges
have also been considered as entry barriers. Generation is a key issue
for competition in the European electricity markets. The generators,
due to the characteristics of the electricity market (the non-storability
of electricity, the high inelasticity of demand, a very wide spectrum of
costs of production and a price equal to the highest oﬀer made in power
exchanges), are able to inﬂuence prices through the use of generation
capacity available to them, in particular by either withdrawing capacity
(which may force recourse to more expensive sources of supply) or by
imposing prices when they are indispensable to meet demand. In the
ﬁrst case, the withdrawal of capacity is proﬁtable if the cost of not
producing is more than compensated by the increase in SMP. A large
portfolio of low-cost plants facilitate this strategy. In the second case,
it is possible to raise SMP even with a relatively small portfolio of
plants depending on other oﬀer constraints (e.g. the location of units).
The behavior of generators thus can impact signiﬁcantly on the level
of prices, even at a level of lower concentration than in other sectors.
3. The Italian electricity market
The Italian IPEX has been organized on the basis of a Pool system,
managed by a market operator (“Gestore del Mercato”, GME) who
collects the bids, determines the merit order for the dispatching of
electricity and is responsible of all the auxiliary services. The Pool
initially planned to enter into force by the 1st January 2001, in the
reality started on the 31st March 2004 as a one-side market. A Single
Buyer, which has been constituted by the Italian TCO, called GRTN,
in 1999, had the responsibility of guaranteeing the supply of electricity
to all the captive customers. Demand-side bidding is allowed since the
1st January 2005.
The Italian electricity market is formed by three diﬀerent markets,
coordinated by the GME: Day-ahead market (MGP), which is the mar-
ket for the physical exchange of energy, a Rebalancing market (MA)
ElectricityIAER01.tex; 17/05/2006; 10:35; p.89
and the Market for the despatchment service (MSD). The three markets
operate in a temporal sequence.
Electricity supply is considered a public service in Italy. The opening
to competition of production, import, export, purchasing and selling of
electricity must be realized in accordance with public service oblig-
ations. Several duties and obligations imposed on diﬀerent operators
in the electricity sector fall within the scope of public obligations. In
particular, as for the managing of the network, the GRTN had the
obligation to ensure the security, continuity and development of the net-
work, to connect to the network all those operators that so request and
to ensure priority to the electricity produced on the basis of domestic
energy sources. The organizational choice of Italy was initially based on
a ISO model, which implied a separation between the ownership and the
managing of the network. GRTN managed the line under the guidance
of the Ministry of Production Activity, whereas a separate company
(Terna s.p.a) owned at 100% by the former public monopolist (ENEL)
had the ownership of the line. On the 1st November 2005 Terna and
GRTN merged so that Italy now has the same organizational model
of other European countries based with a TSO who both owns and
manages the transmission line.
The Single Buyer is obliged to guarantee to captive consumers the
security, continuity and eﬃciency of supply and to apply a unique
tariﬀ. A Code of practice for electricity supply has been introduced
by the Regulator, regarding customers disconnections for debt, com-
plaints management, meters reading, billing, payments, non-payments
handling.
The exchange of electricity in the IPEX, is managed by the GME
and scheduled on the basis of the three separated markets mentioned
above. In the MGP, where electricity is exchanged for each hour of
the following day, producers submit price-quantity bids and the GME
organizes the despatch on the basis of the cost minimizing aggregate
supply. From January 2005, demand bids, submitted by Single Buyer
and by the eligible consumers, are ranked in a decreasing order. The
equilibrium between aggregate supply and demand determines the
hourly SMP price and the total quantity traded. The SMP is paid to
all despatched units. The IPEX is not mandatory so that eligible pur-
chasers and wholesalers may sign bilateral contracts for the exchange
of electricity with producers. The provisional program derived from
the organized Pool market and from the bilateral transactions is then
presented to the TSO who veriﬁes if the electricity ﬂows implied by
the program meet the technical constraints of the transmission line. In
case of congestion, the market is split into four predetermined zones
and new zonal equilibria and prices are calculated.
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4. The existing literature
The above discussed modiﬁcations in the electricity market organi-
zation have stimulated empirical studies of electricity price both in
Europe and in the USA.
Bhanot (2000) analyzes electric power prices from twelve Californian
regional markets. The objective is to characterize and explain the high
degree of autocorrelation and seasonality in power prices and address
salient issues that are pertinent for the valuation and hedging of power-
based ﬁnancial contracts. He shows that price behavior changes with
each regional market, so that a ﬁrm that seeks to value or hedge
power-based contracts must use instruments from the region in which
it operates.
Escribano et al. (2002) use average daily prices of several markets
(Nord Pool, Argentina, Victoria, New Zealand, Spain) and propose a
general and ﬂexible model that allows for deterministic seasonality,
mean reversion, jumps and conditional heteroscedasticity. They use six
nested versions of their model to analyze price behavior in the diﬀerent
markets. Results indicate that AR(1) and GARCH (1,1) with jumps
perform better than other versions.
Lucia et al. (2002) present a model which should permit the deﬁni-
tion of analytical formulae for derivative pricing. They employ dummy
variables and sinusoids to deal with the seasonalities and an AR(1) for
the autocorrelation structure.
Wilkinson et al. (2002) use Australian data and conduct a non-
parametric test of seasonality (peak and oﬀ-peak prices) and of log-
normality. They obtain mixed evidence: the null hypothesis of equal
day eﬀects rejected for some sub-sample periods and not rejected for
some other periods.
Carnero et al. (2003) use European data. They argue that the there
is no need of modelling the conditional volatility when the conditional
mean of the price time series are properly modelled by means of periodic
autoregressive (PAR) processes. They model the seasonalities by means
of sinusoids and weekday dummies. PAR(1) models seem to ﬁt best the
stochastic part of their data. They ﬁnd evidence of mean reversion in
the stochastic part of the model and long memory in the North Pool
prices.
Knittel et al. (2005) study the distributional and temporal properties
of the price process using several common asset price speciﬁcation (as
well as other less convention models). Results reveal several speciﬁc
characteristics unique to electricity prices. They use hourly electricity
prices (Euro/MWh) of each “zone” if there is a separate market price
in each zone. However, with no congestion arbitrage across zones drives
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the price to a converging level. Then, the degree of divergence is an in-
dicator of no arbitrage opportunities and if a high degree of correlation
across “zonal” prices exists, one can use just one zone or the national
time series of prices.
Fabra and Toro (2005) use a Markov-Switching model on Spanish
data to investigate collusive vs. cooperative behavior of bidders.
A common trait of the above literature is the adoption of a sort of
two-step procedure. A preliminary data analysis is initially conducted
in order to gauge from data inspection the main characteristics of the
dynamics of the electricity prices. On the basis of this examination it
is almost invariably recognized that the models used in the second step
for the time series analysis of spot prices have to integrate seasonality
and reﬂect phenomena such as mean reversion, high price-dependent
volatility and leptokurtosis. As discussed above, methods to deal with
seasonalities range from the use of time dummy variables to the appli-
cation of sinusoids at low seasonal frequencies (usually the dominant
2π/365 and the ﬁrst harmonic 4π/365).
In what follows we discuss the results obtained by previous studies
by clustering them in sets of speciﬁc issues.
Seasonality
Real-time balancing and dependency on cyclical demand impose
several diﬀerent seasonal pattern to electricity prices (within day,
week, year) almost everywhere. Deidersen and Tr¨ uck (2002) study
price series for Germany, New Zealand and Spain and report strong
intra-day pattern and peak during midday. Moreover, monthly mean
prices are higher during daytime and weekly seasonal patterns show
the presence of weekend eﬀects. Also annual seasonality was found
with winter prices always higher than prices recorded in other seasons.
Also Knittel et al. (2005) found that Californian electricity prices show
intra-day seasonality and a “summer” (rather than winter) eﬀect,
while Bhanot (2000), using US wholesale transaction prices recorded
from 1 January 1995 to 1 June 1998, discovered that the seasonal
means for peak and oﬀ-peak prices exhibit signiﬁcant variation across
the 12 months and across the delivery points.
Volatility
Storage and transmission problems and the need for markets to be
balanced in real time are responsible of an unusually high volatility. All
the above reported empirical evidence coincide in stressing that there
is a strong correlation between the standard deviation and the mean
price making the volatility dependent on the price level. Furthermore
many time series exhibit some volatility clustering making models for
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conditional heteroscedasticity opportune. When demand approaches
and exceeds the limits of the system generation capacity, prices are
high and more volatile. Many authors model these evidences by
working on log-prices.
Mean reversion
By mean reversion we mean the absence of stochastic trends or
martingale-like behavior of prices. This is a distinctive feature of
electricity prices with respect to other commodity prices. Electricity
prices do not behave as martingales, and the non-deterministic part
of the data generating process does not seem to contain unit roots
(e.g. no random walk like behavior). When hourly prices go up then
they have to move downwards again in a relatively short time. It is
thought that they oscillate around some “equilibrium” mean (possibly
deterministically time varying). This makes a crucial diﬀerence with
ﬁnancial markets. The speed of the reversion is quite informative
also in regulatory terms because it displays the time needed by the
supply side of the market to react to unanticipated events or the
time necessary for the event to be over. The mean reverting nature
of electricity prices is generally explained by market fundamentals.
Commonly held opinion is that only mean reverting models with
jumps allow for brief price spikes (see below) observed in price data
and that only the short term mean reversion is the result of seasonal
patterns. In the long run electricity prices may revert to some,
possibly time-varying, mean. Mean reversion, deterministic trend and
seasonalities are integrated in virtually all the model proposed by
the cited authors, where the price is additively decomposed into a
deterministic and a mean-reverting stochastic component.
Spikes and jumps
They are attributed to sudden and strong increase in demand when
supply is at the limit of generation capacity or to an unexpected break
down of large enough assets. Depending on demand and supply con-
ditions they can also be negative. According to Deidersen and Tr¨ uck
(2002) they are less frequent in market with high level of hydropower
generation. Still, spikes are quite pervasive and it is the presence of
spikes what makes the forecasting properties of the models used in
the literature rather poor. These extreme values can be modelled in
discrete time by using stochastic process with leptokurtic marginal
distributions or in continuous time by introducing jumps in a Wiener
process. Equally important are, at the same time, the problems given
by the appropriate modelling of extreme values of electricity prices
since price series are highly non-normal with large number of extreme
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values observations. Bystr¨ om (2005) models extreme price changes in
the Nord Pool and estimates tail quantiles by ﬁltering the return series
and then applying an extreme value theory model to the residuals. Like
in other studies, the performance of the estimates improves when the
model takes into account explicitly the time-of-the-year seasonality of
the volatility of the data.
5. Preliminary analysis of the Italian data
In this section we study electricity prices recorded in Italy from April
1st 2004 to January 15th 2006. The data are sampled hourly, but in
this study we use daily means2.
The daily prices are represented in Figure 1 together with the total
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Figure 1. Daily means of hourly prices (line, unit = Euros per MWh) and of hourly
demand (dots, unit = MWh×1000) for electricity
ality of the prices is clearly due to the seasonality present in electricity
consumption. Indeed, the unitary price of electricity changes according
to the volume to be produced in a fashion roughly depicted in Figure
2.
It can be clearly noticed by observing Figures 1 and 3, that in year
2004 the prices have been signiﬁcantly more volatile compared to the
following years. This may be due to a learning phase that the traders
have undergone and to the regulation changes that have taken place
in January 2005. Furthermore, the ﬁrst 10-15 days of 2005 witnesses
an abrupt increase of the prices not supported by a corresponding rise
in the demand. This episode has been followed by an inquiry of the
antitrust authority. The rest of the time series show a greater regularity.
Table II reports some descriptive statistics and normality tests and
graphs for the weekly time series of each day. It is interesting to notice
how the days Tuesday-Friday show a very similar behavior (see Figure
3). By looking at the normality tests (a modiﬁed version of the Jarque-
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of electricity prices and demand with non parametric loess
ﬁt.
Bera statistic is presented in Doornik and Hansen, 1994), one is led
to think that the data of Monday-Saturday are normal, but the kernel
estimates suggest the presence of multi-modality for all the densities.
This is due to the presence of seasonality within the year and a possible
trend, which make the data generating process non-stationary and the
marginal densities not well-deﬁned. A further problem might be the
presence of weekday holidays that make such days behave similarly to
Sundays, producing negative skewness.
From the sample autocorrelation function (ACF) reported in Table
II, it is evident the high persistence of linear memory at weekly lags.
This leaves three alternatives open: i) the presence of a deterministic
weekly seasonality, ii) the presence of 7 seasonal unit roots, iii) the
presence of multiple periodic unit roots (Franses and Paap, 2004, ch.4).
In previous literature only the ﬁrst hypothesis has been modelled.













Figure 3. Weekly time series of the seven days.
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Table II. Descriptive statistics, normality tests and kernel density estimates (top
graph) for each day and sample ACF of the whole time series (bottom graph).
mon tue wed thu fri sat sun
Means 58.04 61.96 62.24 62.84 61.94 46.66 37.93
St.Dev. 10.92 10.06 11.42 11.08 11.17 7.83 8.75
Skew -0.487 -0.113 -0.488 -0.054 -0.363 -0.073 -1.334
Kurt 2.977 2.449 3.220 2.595 3.804 3.643 7.453
Min 29.06 35.16 24.68 32.89 25.87 21.14 1.21
Max 80.26 86.91 84.25 90.38 91.49 69.09 55.75
Norm (sig) 0.103 0.590 0.141 0.881 0.099 0.166 0.000
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
In order to deal with within-the-year seasonality the cited authors
have used monthly dummies or sinusoids with frequencies 2π/365 and
4π/365. Since this seasonality is due to the low-frequency components
of the electricity demand, and these components tend to be very regular
across years, it is very sensible to use them directly instead of approx-
imating them in the afore mentioned way. By observing the electricity
demand series in Figure 1 it easy to notice a higher-than-average con-
sumption in winter and summer with sudden decreases in the two main
vacation periods: Christmas holidays (in Italy typically December 24th-
January 6th) and August. In order to successfully extract the described
features, we have designed a low-pass ﬁlter with two diﬀerent cut-
oﬀ frequencies: a lower one for “normal” periods and higher one for
vacation times. This way, the extracted time series is rather smoothed
most of the time, but it does not average out the negative peaks of
the two vacation times. The slight trend in the extracted component
of the consumption has been eliminated by imposing the same value to
December 31st 2004 and December 31st 2005 and adjusting all the other
days by linear discounting. Technical details about ﬁltering are reported
in the Appendix. The low-pass ﬁltered series is shown in Figure 4.
If we assume, at least for the moment, that the price data are gener-
ated by the sum of a deterministic component (seasonalities and trend)
and a (well behaved) stationary process, the least square estimates of
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Figure 4. Band-pass ﬁltered electricity demand of years 2005 (line) and 2004 (dots).
the regression of the prices on the deterministic components are consis-
tent and asymptotically normal (CAN) and the asymptotic covariance
matrix of the estimators may be consistently estimated. We estimated
the following three nested regressions:
yt = τ · t +
7 X
i=1
δ0,i · Di,t + δs · St + ηt, (1)
yt = τ · t +
7 X
i=1
(δ0,i · Di,t + δ1,i · Di,tSt) + ηt, (2)








where Di,t is the daily dummy of day i = 1,...,7 (1 = Monday, 7 =
Sunday), St is the seasonal variable of Figure 4b) and ηt is a stationary
process with absolutely summable covariances. The diﬀerence among
the three regressions is that in equation (1) the within-year seasonality
(St) enters linearly and cannot inﬂuence the within-week seasonality,
in equation (2) St enters linearly and inﬂuences the within-week sea-
sonality and in equation (3) St enters quadratically and inﬂuences the
within-week seasonality. Table III reports summary statistics on the
three regression models and on the validity of the constrains imposing
the equality of all the parameters relative to the days Tuesday-Friday.
The model has been ﬁtted to the whole sample and to the sub-
sample February 1st, 2005 through January 15th, 2006. In both samples
the constrained model (3) outperforms the others, according to the
Schwartz’ Bayesian Information Criterion. It is striking how the per-
formance of all the models drastically worsen when the whole sample is
considered: for the best ﬁtting model, the standard error of regression
is more than double and the R2 is 20% smaller. These and other con-
siderations have lead us to conclude that omitting the ﬁrst 10 months
will let us produce more accurate models and predictions.
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Table III. Diagnostics for the regression models of equations (1)-(3).
Whole sample eq. (1) eq. (2) constr eq. (3) constr
R
2 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.69
S.E. of Regression 7.93 7.85 7.83 7.68 7.65
LogLik -2281 -2272 -2273 -2254 -2255
BIC 7.06 7.09 7.03 7.10 7.02
Wald Test Sig
∗ 0.52 0.55
Feb2005-Jan2006 eq. (1) eq. (2) constr eq. (3) constr
R
2 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.92
S.E. of Regression 4.97 4.52 4.51 3.49 3.48
LogLik -1050 -1014 -1016 -920 -924
BIC 6.17 6.06 5.98 5.64 5.51
Wald Test Sig
∗ 0.32 0.23
∗Wald test for the equality of all the parameters relative to Tuesday-Friday.
6. Stochastic models for the daily electricity prices
In this section we formulate and test a set of models for the Italian
prices. These models encompass the deterministic and the stochastic
components in order to incorporate the memory present in the regres-
sion residuals, which plays an important role in short term forecasting
and in derivative pricing.
By looking at the sample ACF and PACF functions it can be no-
ticed the presence of linear memory both in the errors and the squared
errors, suggesting the opportunity of ARMA-GARCH models. Maybe
curiously, the model in this family that seems to ﬁt the data best is the
constrained regression (3) with AR(1,6)-GARCH(1,1) errors:
ηt = φ1ηt−1 + φ6ηt−6 + σtzt (4a)
σ2




with zt i.i.d. standard normal process.
Another attractive class of models that could ﬁt the diﬀerent
characteristics of the days better than simple ARMA is that of
periodic ARMA-GARCH3. A periodic ARMA is an ARMA model
with coeﬃcients that vary periodically (with seasons). For example a
PARMA(1,1) with period 7 is
yt = µt + φ1,t(yt−1 − µt−1) + σtzt + θ1,tσt−1zt−1 (5a)
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Figure 5. ACF and PACF of regression errors of model (3) with constrains.
with zt i.i.d. and
µt+7 = µt, φt+7 = φt, σt+7 = σt, θt+7 = θt. (5b)
A periodic ARMA is a non-stationary model since mean, variance and
linear ﬁlter depend on time. Nevertheless a PARMA model for daily
data has a VARMA representation for the vector of the seven weekly
time series. If the VARMA representation has a causal stationary so-
lution, then the process is said periodically stationary. For details on
periodic time series models refer to Franses and Paap (2004) and the
references therein.
A PARMA model may be enriched with a periodic (but also non
periodic) GARCH-type structure by opportunely redeﬁning σt in equa-
tion (5). From our analyses we expect a non-periodic GARCH-type
process to be enough. By looking at the vast GARCH library, we
pick the EGARCH of Nelson (1991), since it is easier to adapt to a
periodically changing unconditional variance, it allows for asymmetry
(which implies skewness in the unconditional distribution) and does
not impose constrains on the parameters:
logσ2





t+7 = ¯ σ2
t.
In order to identify the orders of a PARMA model the periodic ACF
and PACF functions may be used. The seven periodic autocorrelation
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with γt+7(k) = γt(k). The periodic ACF and partial ACF (PACF) are
deﬁned similarly to the non-periodic one (for deﬁnitions and algorithms
refer to Sakai, 1982). Figure 6 reports the sample ACF and PACF of





























Figure 6. Sample periodic ACF (bar) and PACF (line) of the estimated regression
(3) errors.
linear memory changes according to the weekdays. Particularly, it can
be noticed the lag 3 partial autocorrelation of Monday, for which the
previous Friday carries the most important information, and the scarce
inﬂuence of previous days on Saturday.
7. Estimation results
The process of ﬁnding a good model for the Italian data has been
incremental: we began with simple models and added complexity grad-
ually, in order to match features of the data that appeared during the
modelling process and had not been included in previous versions.
M1. Reg-AR(1,6)-GARCH(1,1), zt ∼ (0,1);
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M2. Reg-PAR(1), zt ∼ N(0,1);
M3. Reg-PAR(1), zt ∼ GED4;
M4. Reg-PAR(5), zt ∼ GED with
Mon : ηt = φ1,1ηt−1 + φ3,1ηt−3 + σ1zt
Tue : ηt = φ1,2ηt−1 + σ2zt
Wed : ηt = φ1,3ηt−1 + σ3zt
Thu : ηt = φ1,4ηt−1 + σ4zt
Fri : ηt = φ1,5ηt−1 + φ2,5ηt−5 + σ5zt
Sat : ηt = φ1,6ηt−1 + σ6zt
Sun : ηt = φ1,7ηt−1 + σ7zt;
M5. like Mod4. but with EGARCH(1,1) of equation (6).
Table IV reports some goodness-of-ﬁt statistics and diagnostics tests
for the ﬁve models plus a constrained version of M5. (the insigniﬁ-
cant parameters and the insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent parameters have been
constrained).
Table IV. Goodness-of-ﬁt statistics of the various models.
M1. M2. M3. M4. M5. M5.c
LogLik -834 -840 -813 -804 -792 -798
N. of Coefs. 15 27 28 30 33 23
AIC 4.88 4.97 4.82 4.78 4.73 4.71
BIC 5.08 5.27 5.13 5.11 5.09 4.96
Q(10) Sig. 0.229 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005
Q(10)
2 Sig. 0.855 0.012 0.221 0.724 0.989 0.989
Q(10) is the lag 10 Box-Lijung statistics on the standardized residulas.
Q(10)
2 is the lag 10 Box-Lijung statistics on the squared standardized residuals.
Model M5., speciﬁcally in its constrained version, seems to outper-
form the others, although the simple AR-GARCH works reasonably
well, if one is lead by Schwartz’ BIC. Table V reports the con-
strained estimates. The asymmetry parameter of the EGARCH has
been eliminated since not signiﬁcant.
The results obtained in this application can be contrasted with those
reported by many authors who studied other European Pools. Daily
equilibrium price in Italy were found by us to be high, non normally
distributed and leptokurtic. This shape is similar to the one found for
the Nord Pool by both Bystrstrom (2005) and Lucia et al. (2002) and by
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Table V. Estimates of model 5. constrained (only the parameters of the stochastic
part are reported).
Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-Ratio Prob.
φ1,1 0.251 0.098 2.555 0.011
φ1,2 = φ1,4 = φ1,5 0.776 0.047 16.504 0.000
φ1,3 0.985 0.073 13.475 0.000
φ1,7 0.827 0.103 8.034 0.000
φ2,5 0.211 0.075 2.823 0.005
φ3,1 0.388 0.073 5.288 0.000
α 0.361 0.101 3.561 0.000
β 0.695 0.150 4.621 0.000
σ1 = ... = σ7 1.349 0.368 3.662 0.000
GED’s r 0.925 0.082 11.296 0.000
Escribano et al. (2002) for the Spanish Pool. Mean reversion is another
characteristic of the Italian Pool and its speed is more similar to that
found in Spain by Escribano et al. (2002) rather than to that discovered
in the Nord Pool by several authors. Diﬀerences with respect to Spain
and Nord Pool are observed in the seasonal volatility of the Italian data
as well as in the jump process, possibly depending on the diﬀerences
in the structure of production capacity. As for the seasonalities, Italian
data show peculiar characteristics mainly due to the high concentration
of the vacations in August and about Christmas, of which we took care
in an original manner. As in Carnero et al. (2003) we found evidence of
periodicity in the autoregressive coeﬃcients: the prices of the weekdays
correlate very weakly with previous weekend prices and the prices on
weekends are not correlated with previous weekday prices. Carnero et
al. found long memory in Nord Pool prices, but such a feature may
not be inferred from the sample periodic ACF of Italian prices (cfr.
Figure 6). Thus, the features determining Italian price behaviour is
market speciﬁc, but some elements are common to other markets. This
implies that perspective comparative works should incorporate into the
analysis speciﬁc aspects of the electricity generation/demand structure,
such as diﬀerences in technological and climate conditions, as well as
some common elements, such as oil price, aﬀecting local markets in
diﬀerent ways.
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8. Conclusion
The analysis of Italian electricity prices carried out in this study per-
mitted a good understanding of the most relevant features of these
data. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is the signiﬁcant change of behavior that the
data generating process has undergone starting from mid January 2005.
This may be due to a learning time needed by the traders involved and
by a change of regulation that took place in that period.
Another peculiarity of the Italian prices is the relevant drop during
Christmas holidays and summer vacations, that makes the use of few si-
nusoids or monthly dummies not ﬁt for modelling with-year seasonality.
An original methodology to deal with this problem has been developed.
Furthermore, the interaction of the within-year seasonality with the
within-week seasonality has also been modelled.
A slow but signiﬁcant (increasing) linear trend in the prices has also
been noted and ﬁtted. The reasons for this may be found in the relevant
growth of the prices of hydrocarbon-based energy sources.
Leptokurtic PAR-GARCH models seem to ﬁt best the diﬀerent
amount of memory of past observations that each weekday carries, as
well as the presence of spikes and some form of volatility clustering.
Although the limited length of the price time series leaves some
questions open, the models developed in this paper seem to perform
quite well.
Appendix
In order to ﬁlter the low frequencies of the daily time series of demanded
electricity, we designed a partially model based low pass ﬁlter with time
varying cut-oﬀ frequency. We used the model






t + εt (7a)
µt = µt−1 + βt−1 (7b)































with ωj = j · 2π/7, j = 1,2,3, εt ∼ (0,σ2
ε), ζt ∼ (0,σ2
ζ), κ
(j)




κ). µt captures the low frequency movements in which we are inter-
ested, the γt’s take care of the within-week seasonality and εt is a white
noise. Since the cut-oﬀ frequency of the low-pass ﬁlter for extracting µt
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is determined by the signal-to-noise ratio ρ = σ2
ζ/σ2
ε, we ﬁxed it to 1600
for “normal” days and to 100 for Christmas and Summer vacation time
(24Dec-6Jan and July-September). The other unknown variances have
been estimated by ML. The ﬁltered series is produced by the Kalman
smoother.



















ρ is deﬁned as above, r is the signal-to-noise ratio relative to the sea-
sonal component (the estimated value is 48.660.207, meaning that the
weekly seasonality is practically time-invariant) and ωj = 2πj/7.
The resulting cutoﬀ frequency for normal times is 0.05π correspond-
ing to a period of circa 40 days. The cutoﬀ frequency for vacation days
is 0.10π (ca. 20 days).
Acknowledgements
This paper is part of a research program on the regulation of the
electricity sector in Italy. We would like to thank the University of
Milan-Bicocca for ﬁnancing the research with a FRA/2003 (ex 60%)
grant and MURST for a PRIN 2004 grant.
We thank REF (Research of Economics and Finance) for provid-
ing us with the Italian data, and particularly Pia Saraceno, Clau-
dia Checchi, Edoardo Settimio and Mara Zanini for comments and
suggestions.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sixty-First
International Atlantic Economic Conference. We thank Peter van
der Hoek, Kinga Mazur, Martin McGuire and Michael Ye for useful
comments.
Notes
1 On the contrary, within Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, grid congestion is
managed by counter-trade purchases based on bids from generators.
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2 In much of the existing literature only daily means are considered.
3 The ﬁrst (and so far only) application of a PAR model to daily electricity prices
has been carried out by Carnero et al. (2003).
4 The Generalized Error Distribution (GED) or Exponential Power Distribution
has a shape parameter r that for r = 2 makes it a Normal distribution, for r ∈ (0,2)
makes it a leptokurtic distribution and for r ∈ (2,∞) turns it into a platokurtic
distribution (cfr. Nelson, 1991). The GED we use has zero mean and unit variance.
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